Category: malware

Hatman, Triton ICS Malware Schneider Analysis

A Triconex Industrial controller allows triple redundancy and 2/3 consensus vote based control and has its origins in the 80’s industrial needs for safety for industrial controllers. The Hatman/Triton ICS malware targetting this specific controller, came to light in 2017 and details were released slowly.

From the SchneiderElectric and Mandiant analysis of the malware, more technical details appeared recently. A summary is below.

Physical access to the controller network is necessary. The Triconex controller needs to be in Program mode. A program agent running on windows in the same network talks over a Tricon protocol to program the Tricon controller to install/deploy another program. This latter program runs like a regular program on the controller, on every scan cycle, and removes traces of itself afterwards. It runs in parallel in three controllers like any other Triconex program.

Once here, it is looking for a way to elevate it privilege level. It starts observing the runtime, including memory inspections. There is a memory backdoor attempted, but there is a probable error handling mistake which prevents this. Now to be able to access the firmware, it takes advantage of a zero-day vulnerability in the firmware.  It is able to install itself in the firmware, overwriting a network function call. In the end it installs a Remote Access Terminal to allow remote access of the controller. This could have been a vector to download further payloads, but no evidence was found that this RAT was actually used.

Source code of the program is at .

Zero day attacks are a continuing challenge as by definition they are not widely known before they are used for an attack. However a secure by design approach reduces the attack surface for exploits.


Ethereum Security and the DAO Solidity Attack

The basics of Ethereum are described in the Gavin Wood paper. A list of keywords in Solidity are described in this file from its source, which includes “address”, “contract”, “event”, “mapping” and “wei” ( 1 Eth= 10^18 Wei). This list does not include “gas”, which is a mechanism described in Wood’s paper to combat abuse. Interestingly the paper says “The first example of utilising the proof-of-work as a strong economic signal to secure a currency was by Vishnumurthy et al [2003]”, aka the Karma paper.

The karma paper talks about solving a cryptographic puzzle as enabling one to join the network and be assigned a bank set: “the node certifies that it completed this computation by encrypting challenges provided by its bank-set nodes with its private key. Thus each node is assigned an id beyond its immediate control, and acquires a public-private key pair that can be used in later stages of the protocol without having to rely on a public-key infrastructure”. Crypto puzzles for diverseproblems have been proposed before, a survey and comparison is at

The DAO attack had 3 components, a hacker, a malicious contract and a vulnerable contract. The malicious contract is used to withdraw funds from the vulnerable contract so that it does not get a chance to decrement its balance. Oddly enough the gas mechanism which is supposed to limit computation did not kick in to stop this repeated remittance.

A few weeks before the DAO attack someone had pointed out to me that security of solidity was a bit of an open problem. My feeling was contracts should be layered above the value exchange mechanism, not built into it. Bitcoin based protocols with the simpler OP_RETURN semantics appeared more solid. Later around October’16 at an Ethereum meetup, Fred Ehrsam made the comment that most new projects would be using Ethereum instead of bitcoin. But Bitcoin meetups had more real-world use cases being discussed. The technical limitations exist, which are being addressed by forks such as SegWit2x this November.  Today saw a number of interesting proposals with Ethereum, including Dharma, DataWaller and BloomIDs. Security would be a continuing  concern with the expanding scope of such projects.

Weeping Angel

Sales of hardware camera blockers and similar devices should increase, with the Weeping Angel disclosure. Wikileaks detailed how the CIA and MI5 hacked Samsung TVs to silently monitor remote communications. Interesting to read for the level of technical detail: . The attack was called ‘Weeping Angel’, a term borrowed from Doctor Who.

Other such schemes are described at , including a iPhone implant to get data from your phone – .

ICS Threat Landscape

Kaspersky labs released a report on Industrial and Control System (ICS) security trends. The data was reported to be gathered using Kaspersky Security Network (KSN), a distributed antivirus network.

The report is here –


The rising trend is partly due to the isolation strategy currently being followed for ICS network security no longer being effective in protecting industrial networks.

IOT security attacks list

Mirror of :

A curated list of hacks in IoT space so that researchers and industrial products can address the security vulnerabilities (hopefully).



Home Automation

Connected Doorbell


Smart Coffee


Smart Plug


Traffic Lights



Light Bulbs


Smart Scale

Smart Meters




Media Player & TV



Lessons from SF Muni Ransomware

On Nov 25, a hacker going by “andy saolis” infected the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency’s (SMFTA) network with ransomware that encrypted data on 900 office computers, spreading through the system’s Windows operating system. Saolis threatened to publish 30 gigabytes of data, including contracts, employee data, customer information.  SMFTA’s ticketing system was shut down to prevent the malware from spreading. The attacker demanded a 100 Bitcoin ransom, around $73,000, to unlock the affected files. Salted hash reported the malware is likely a variant of HDDCryptor, which uses commercial tools to encrypt hard drives and network shares.

The service was restored due to backups . However consider these systems were in an ICS scenario. An unexpected downtime would result, which would be unacceptable.

The Dyn DNS DDOS Attack Oct 21

DYN is a DNS provider internet infrastructure company. It’s the name behind widely used DynDNS. It supports DNS for twitter, visa, github, mongo, netflix and several other big tech sites.

Doug Madory a researcher at DYN, presented a talk  on DDoS attacks in Dallas at a meeting of the North American Network Operators Group (NANOG) 68 – his was the last talk on Oct 19, wednesday. The talk discussed the attack on Krebs on Security last month and details other such attacks.

On Friday several sites serviced by DYN were attacked in a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack.

The distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack involved malicious DNS lookup requests from tens of millions of IP addresses including a botnet on a large number of IoT devices infected with the Mirai malware, which is designed to brute force security on any IoT device. There are cameras involved with fixed passwords that are burned into the firmware, that cannot be changed.

The implications of IoT devices that are 1) unsecure 2) impossible to secure and 3) infected by malware and 4) controlled by a botnet that is controlled by malicious intent are made clearer with this attack.

Update on DDOS mitigation:  RFC 3882,  Configuring BGP to block Denial-of-Service attacks, discusses Remote Triggered Black Hole (RTBH) method, to configure certain routers to selectively stop malicious high volume traffic which is targeting a particular IP.  The target site is made inaccessible but the rest of the network service stays active. An example configuration is at .  The improvement is to reduce the side-effects of such a delisting, to enable faster recovery when the attack is over.